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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ROOSEVELT CITY,
Appellate Case No. 20090850

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
DAVID KOLE WRIGHT,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The statutory authority that confers jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals to decide
the appeal is Utah Code Arm. Section 78A-4-103(e). Judge A. Lynn Payne found David
Kole Wright guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs on July 20,
2009. Judge A. Lynn Payne sentenced him on September 14,2009.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Was there sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction against the appellant for
driving under the influence and/or drugs?
STANDARD OF REVIEW. "When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of
evidence, we must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of
the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction

that a mistake has been made." Spanish Fork v. Bryan. 1999 UT App 61, ^ 5, 975 P.2d
501 (citations omitted). However, 'before we can uphold a conviction it must be
supported by a quantum of evidence concerning each element of the crime as charged
from which the fact finder may base its conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'"
State v. Larsen. 999 P.2d 1252 (Ut. App 2000).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6a-502, set forth in the Addendum, is relevant to a
determination of this appeal.
CITATION TO THE RECORD THAT THE ISSUE WAS PRESERVED
IN THE TRIAL COURT
"When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the
question of sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised
whether or not the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to
such findings or made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion
for a new trial." State v. Larsen. 2000 UT App 106,19, 999 P.2d 1252.
Further, David Cole Wright's counsel preserved the issue when he argued to the
court. "I don't - -1 don't think there's enough to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
he'd taken medication to cause this condition. There's no evidence of what the
medication was. R. 41: p. 30, lines 8-11.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
An information was filed against Wright on March 3, 2009. R.l. An arraignment
was held on May 11, 2009. R.6. A bench trial was held on July 20, 2009. R.41. This
appeal is taken from a bench trial conviction entered on July 20, 2009. R.30.
II. Statement of the Facts
On October 28, 2008, at approximately 7:00 a.m., officer Henry McKenna of the
Roosevelt City Police Department received a call from the Western Hills Motel. R. 41: p.
5, lines 1-7. When the officer arrived at the Western Hills Motel, he observed, a male, in
the driver's seat, with a car running. R. 41: p. 7, lines 13-14. The driver at some point
had a lit cigarette in his mouth and it had burned out and had ashes all over his chest. R.
41: p. 7, lines 15-16. At some point the officer was able to get the drivers attention and
the officer learned that the individuals name was David Kole Wright. R. 41: p. 7 & 8.
When officer McKenna first arrived, Wright was slumped over in the driver's seat.
R. 41: p. 8, line 20-21. Officer McKenna began pounding on the windows trying to wake
the individual. R. 41: p. 9, lines 15-16. Officer McKenna testified that he spent about 15
to 20 minutes trying to get Wright's attention. R. 41: p. 9, line 18. Officer McKenna then
used a six foot rod that the police use to unlock locks on automatic vehicles. R. 41: p. 10,
lines 13-15. Officer McKenna then used the rod to poke Wright until he woke up. R. 41:
p. 10, lines 22-25.
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When Wright woke up he was very disoriented and didn't know exactly where he
was. R. 41: p. 11, lines 4-6. When Wright woke up he rolled down the window and
officer McKenna asked him to exit the vehicle. R. 41: p. 11, lines 7-8. It took Wright
another minute to exit the vehicle. R. 41: p. 11, line 8.
When Wright exited the vehicle officer McKenna had to help him because Wright
almost fell over. R. 41: p. 12, lines 11-13. Officer McKenna then physically helped
Wright to the back of the car. R. 41: p. 12, lines 17-19. During officer McKenna's
contact with Wright he did not smell the odor of alcohol. R. 41: p. 13, lines 6-7 and p. 22,
linel8.
Officer McKenna then went and talked to Wright's girlfriend. R. 41: p. 13, lines
4-10. Officer McKenna then went back to talk to Wright. During this conversation,
officer McKenna determined that Wright had taken some medication. R. 41: p. 14, line 2.
There was no testimony regarding what kind of medication Wright might have taken.
However, officer McKenna testified that most medication does not cause impairment. R.
41: p. 22, lines 24-25.
After Wright was detained for about 20 to 30 minutes, he was cited for driving on
a suspended license and released. R. 41: p. 18, lines 2-3. There were no field sobriety
tests nor any other physical tests performed on Mr. Wright. R. 41: p. 22, lines 11-15. Mr.
Wright was allowed to leave without having his blood draw taken or a any DUI charge
made. R. 41: p. 20, lines 12-12.
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Three or four months later the Roosevelt city attorney's office decided to charge
Wright with driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs. R. 41: p. 18, lines 5-7.
Further, during cross-examination officer McKenna testified that there were no
field sobriety tests nor any other physical tests performed on Wright. R. 41: p. 22, lines
11-15. Blood was not drawn or tested. R. 41: p. 18 & 19. There were several officers
present during this incident and according to officer McKenna he wanted to test Wright,
but he was told not to by his superiors. R. 41: p. 18, lines 22-23.
During cross-examination it was determined that officer McKenna had actually
had two encounters with Wright. One encounter occurred in the morning (the incident
described above) and a second incident that occurred in the afternoon at Wright's motel
room. R. 41: p. 21.
Officer McKenna testified his police report did not say anything about Wright
taking medication during the morning incident. R. 41: p. 21. Further, officer McKenna
could not remember whether it was during the morning incident or the afternoon incident
that medication had been discussed. R. 41: p. 21.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Wright asserts that the trial court did not have sufficient evidence to convict him of
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs. In the morning of October 10,
2008, Wright was seized by police officers, while he was sitting in a vehicle in the
parking lot in the Western Hills Motel. During this incident Wright had difficulty
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walking and performing some functions. However, Wright was not asked to perform
field sobriety tests. The police did not smell the odor of alcohol or any other drug.
Wright was not requested to take any chemical tests, including blood tests. Although
Officer McKenna wanted Wright to be given additional tests, his superiors disagreed, and
Wright was released without being cited for DUL
Officer McKenna testified that Wright told him that he had taken some
medication. However, officer McKenna could not remember if he had been told about
the medication during the morning incident or whether he was told about the medication
during a second afternoon incident that had occurred with Wright. In any event, there
was no testimony regarding what type of medication was allegedly taken. There was no
testimony regarding when the medication had been taken, whether it was before the
morning incident or whether it occurred later in the day before the second incident.
ARGUMENT
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION
AGAINST DAVID KOLE WRIGHT FOR DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF
ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS.
RULE
"When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, we must sustain the
trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the
appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
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made." Spanish Fork v. Bryan. 1999 UT App 61, lj 5, 975 P.2d 501 (citations omitted).
"In addition, '[a] guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely on inferences that
give rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of guilt."5 Id. "However, 'before we
can uphold a conviction it must be supported by a quantum of evidence concerning each
element of the crime as charged from which the fact finder may base its conclusion of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Larsen, 999 P.2d 1252 (Ut. App 2000).
"Defendant 'must marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court' findings
of fact and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings against an attack.'" Id. at % 11 (citing
State v. Moosman. 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990).
ANALYSIS
In order for Wright to prevail on his appeal he must first marshal all the evidence
in favor of the state and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable
inferences drawn from them are insufficient to find Wright guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. The evidence that Roosevelt City produced is as follows:
1) "The driver, a male, in the driver's seat passed out, car running. He had a - - at
some point had a lit cigarette in his mouth and it had burned out and had ashes all over his
chest." R. 41: p. 7, lines 13-16.
2) The driver was Wright. R. 41: p. 7 & 8.
3) "He had had [sic] a lit cigarette that was in his lips, and he had slumped over to
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the point the cigarette had burned out and was out at the filter." R. 41: p. 8, lines 9-12.
4) "I began pounding on the windows trying to wake the individual. I went to the
window he was at. I went to the passenger's window, back to this window, probably 15
to 20 minutes trying to wake the individual. Pounding on the glasses and the side of the
door trying to wake the individual." R. 41: p. 9, lines 15-21.
5) "With the rod while trying to get in because he's right next to the window and
door itself. He started to move a little bit, so I continued to prod him with the pole to try
and wake him up. And he, after five minutes, did rouse with me hitting him with the
pole." R.41:p. 10&11.
6) "He was very disoriented, didn't know exactly where he was at. It took him a
minute to even function to roll the window down." R. 41: p. 11, lines 4-6.
7) "When he started to get out of the car. I actually physically had to grab him
because he almost fell over . . . then I asked him to move to the back of the car, and I had
to physically help him to the back of the car." R. 41: p. 12, lines 11-19.
8) "He needed assistance in just about everything. When he had tried to grab his
license I had to assist him in showing him which one is his license, because he kept going
- - he had a rather large billfold, and he went through the billfold probably six times. And
I had to help him find his license. While standing there we had to lean him up against the
car so that he wouldn't fall over. Everything he did he struggled with due to his
impairment." R. 41: p. 15, lines 11-20.

8

officer and your training being arounu i\

A? i:i*-:

s

i; •*

that he was in a condition where he could safely dri\ e a vehicle?
A

D A*.r

1 ^ H n e s 1-5.
. detained 1 lii i I ii i a i t officer's cai w hile w e

because he

was actually - - couldn't stand up, he was snltitu? verbalb, ubiisn r nilli ni. \ <M> psM-dl .ill
and getting disorderly, so we placed him in a car to calm him down." R. 4 i. p. J1, lines
M- IS'1
• rvrnil nuniilrs *

»:•

^ . nk u a^ccrtau, »k iu^. uii-^

some medication. At that point, that's all 1 » *d mi ^

.

" T " -h.' was charged with Driving I inder the Inllucncc oi Alcohol and'or d r u ^
under I Huh 1 ode Ann. Section 41-6a-502. The relevant part of the section states as
follow, "i I i \ ficiM(»ii III iv in I M|K'nile m In1 ftililal physical contr ol of a vehicle w ithin
this state if the person. ^ v As under the influence of alcnln, .1 ,iin Juiy,. in Ibr < umluii I
infl.uen.ee of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely
nperalinji «i vehicle
B e f o r e t h i s COi 111 (Mill n n l i n M 11 n - 11 • -• I

m i l s i mtivii I m p llii in, fit!!1*."! In; i in | • „ »i i I 11 ni ixx o f

evidence concerning each element of the crime as charged, i ipon which a conclusion < I
£vni-i beyond a reasonable doubt may be based Spain »"

9

'" y v, Bryan, 1999 UT 61,

Wright asserts that the State of Utah did not produce a quantum of evidence that he
was under the influence of alcohol, any drug or the combined influence of alcohol or any
drug to a degree that rendered him incapable of safely operating a vehicle. In summary,
the City did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any inability to operate the vehicle
was caused by alcohol or drugs or a combination of the two.
The term "quantum" is defined as a quantity or amount. Wright asserts that the
trial court erred based on two reasons. First, Wright asserts that there is a dispute as to
whether there is any credible testimony upon which the trial court could make a finding
that Wright was on medication or alcohol at the time he was in physical control of the
vehicle. Second, if there is credible testimony that he was on medication, there is no
evidence that the medication had the ability to impair Wright.
Was there any credible testimony or evidence regarding the use of alcohol or
drugs? The City's only witness testified that there was "No. alcohol, no." R. 41: p. 22,
line 18. "There was no marijuana, no." R. 41: p. 23, line 3. At one point in the officer's
testimony, he testified that "[ajfter several minutes of talking with him I was able to
ascertain he had taken some medication." R. 41: p. 13 & 14. However, during crossexamination the officer recanted this statement.
Officer McKenna had two encounters with Wright on October 10, 2008. The first
encounter was in the morning, which is the subject matter of the present case. Wright had
been found in his vehicle, at the time Wright was not tested for drugs or alcohol. Several
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The officer then went on to explain that he had dealt with Wright both in the
morning and in the afternoon, so he did not recall exactly when Wright had mentioned the
ii'inlu alion. I lierefbre, there is no credible testimony or evidence that Wright was under
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the influence of alcohol and/or drugs during the time that he was in physical control of the
vehicle in the morning of October 10, 2010.
Second, Wright asserts that even if the court determines that there is a quantum of
evidence that Wright had taken medication during the morning incident, there is
absolutely no evidence that the medication was of the type that would impair Wright.
There was no blood tests taken. The only testimony on the subject supports Wright's
position. Officer McKenna testified as follows:
Q. Well, I mean something that might cause impairment.
A. No. Most medication does not cause impairment, so I can't - - or doesn't smell,
so I can't - R. 41: p. 22 & 23.
Wright's argument at trial and on appeal is simple. There is not sufficient
evidence to show that he was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. City did not bear
its burden showing that Wright was on any type of alcohol or drug that could impair him.
Wright also asserts that the trial court inappropriately placed the burden on the defendant
to prove that the impairment was caused by something other than drugs.
Wright's attorney argued that there were other conditions that could cause
impairment and that the City did not prove that the impairment was caused by drugs.
However, the trial court made the following statement: "So the question is, well, is this
something that was caused by an illness. I don't have any information before the Court
that he was ill, you know, to - - to say - - to a make a finding that he was ill would be
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for DUI. Months later, the city attorney made a decision to prosecute Wright. R. 41: p.
18.
The second error Wright asserts that the trial court made was that instead of
requiring the State of Utah to prove that Wright was impaired by drugs or alcohol beyond
a reasonable double, it shifted the burden to Wright. Wright was required to show that his
impairment was due to something other than drugs.
The court in State v. Reyes, 116 P.3d 305, stated:
No person accused in the United States may be convicted of a crime unless
each element of the offense has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358. 362, 90 S. Ct. 1068. 25 L.Ed. 2d 368 (1970).
The Supreme Court has assigned this standard of proof constitutional status,
linking it to both the Fifth Amendment right to due process of law and the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275,
278, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed. 2d 182 (1993); Winship, 397 U.S. at 362,
364, 90 S.Ct.1068. The degree of certainty of guilt that we insist be held by
those entrusted with judging the fate of persons charged with crimes before
we will permit the State to wield its power to punish is not only a measure
of evidence, but also in a more fundamental sense a gauge of our nation's
conscience. The measure of certainty the law demands before finding guilt
reflects the balance we are willing to strike between ensuring that all of the
guilty are brought to justice and preventing the conviction and punishment
of the innocent. Blackstone set an enduring benchmark for the measure of
certainty required to convict in a civilized society when he stated that 'the law
holds that it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent
suffer.5 4 William Blackstones, Commentaries *27, quoted in Coffin v.
United States. 156 U.S. 432, 456, 15 S.Ct. 394, 39 L.Ed. 481 (1895).
State v. Reves, 2005 UT 33, If 11.
The mere morsel of evidence that the State of Utah produced in this matter was
stated by Judge Payne in his closing statements, " . . . all we have is the statement that he'd
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contests the accuracy of this finding because the officer could i\< ? remember \\ 1 • > -< this
referred to the morning incident or afternoon incident. In any event, this is not sufficient
evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the medication caused Wright to be
impair ed.
CONCI.UMUN
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ADDENDUM

41-6a-502 Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both
with specific or unsafe blood alcohol concentration. (2005)
(1) A person may not operate or be actual physical control of a vehicle within this state
if the person:
(a) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent chemical test
shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams
or greater at the time of the test;
(b) is under the influence of alcohol, an drug, or the combined influence of alcohol
and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a
vehicle.
c) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of
operation or actual physical control.
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 100
milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be based upon grams of
alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(3) A violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance similar to this
section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6a-510

